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Seeing a pattern in a medium of yam emerge on a pair o f 
needles, initially from a single row of loops, and grow to becom e 
an article of clothing, is immensely satisfying. Indeed, every 
m om ent o f knitting provides immediate gratification. This 
is perhaps why knitting, like many other occupations of the 
hands, is so calming to the soulful organism, at once delivering 
analgesic relief from stress in the form of an endorphin cocktail, 
and simultaneously aligning the mind with the movements 
of the spheres. And so knitting soothes the Animal soul as it 
simultaneously stimulates the distinctively Human one.
A philosopher’s rationale for knitting, however, cannot 
appeal to the effects o f knitting on the Animal soul— or, at any 
rate, not on paper. The Animal rationale, it seems, is still too 
closely allied in many minds with being Woman— or, at any 
rate, Domestic and Lowly. And being Woman (or Domestic or 
Lowly) has not yet been entirely rehabilitated in the academy. 
This is thoroughly regrettable. Because obviously the Animal 
and the Human are overlapping— affectations to the contrary 
notwithstanding. And so it seem s that if 1 would bring my 
knitting into the departmental and senate meetings— as 1 
indeed w ould— then 1 am obliged to offer reasons for its 
loftiness— reasons for its being more on the Human side than 
on the Animal side of the equation. So here, for the record, are 
som e distinctively philosophical reasons for knitting.
First, and most attractively: a knitter bears the characteristic 
mark o f the divine, because at every mom ent a knitter is 
bringing forth something out of nothing. (Nine out of ten times, 
the knitter is also trying to keep warm in the crib another thing 
that was also brought forth out o f (nearly) nothing.) Next, the 
knitter is intimately acquainted with the Mobius strip, the Klein 
bottle, and all the other subversions, diversions, and perversions 
of mundane earthbound topology. The Knitter thus ponders 
the perplexities of space, time, and how the whole universe 
might be wrought from string— and thus fabricates (what else?) 
that luminously high-dimensional Yarn Theory o f Everything, 
so purl-plexing to the non-knit wit. The questions knitters 
have examined are profound and wide ranging, from logic to 
metaphysics to morals, and include: (1) Why is it the case that 
the negation of nothing is knot, but the negation o f knot is not 
nothing?; (2) How does the occupation o f three-dimensional 
space by a strict sequence o f (roughly) one-dim ensional 
vibrating loops, connected in a two-dimensional array, result in 
the look and feel of exactly three dimensions?; and, of course,
(3) How does one cast off one ’s chains?
But, unlike the mathematician, not only can the knitter 
bring the perversions and other oddities into being, but the 
knitter can also (this is my own specialty) help them to pass 
away. We knitters have created knots like nobody’s business— 
knots that only a chosen few  outside our fellowship have been 
privileged to behold, let alone hold in the palm o f the hand and
allow to rest warmingly in the lap. This is the source of intense 
power. And with power com es an equally intense obligation 
of putting things right.
Which brings m e to my major point— the major reason 
for philosophical knitting: knitting is about putting things right, 
and so reflecting upon knitting is reflecting upon this important 
duty and activity. And for both these things w e knitters have 
special insights, because w e knitters just see the right way of 
things. We who knit keep knitting because, when w e look at our 
handiwork, w e can see what to do next (like Wittgenstein said). 
And this manifesto com es apart into two theses for defense: 
first, that the British empiricists were in egregious error when 
they propounded their reductionist views on the evidence 
of the senses; and second, that seeing how to go next is just 
good sense (good observation, if you will)— if you’re a knit-wit, 
anyway. But once you see this, you will see your way clear to 
Empiricism without Kant. These are the philosophical theses 1 
will propound in the space that falls to me here. These are twin 
Aristotelian doctrines that a Knitter (well, this one anyway) will 
be proud to submit for your approval.
Three Cheers for Aristotle, Part 1: Seeing and  
Believing
The Knitter, like the Philosopher, knows that observation and 
judgment lie on a continuum. True: the world presents us with 
a richly structured array, in unrelentingly continuous flux, of 
multimodal stimulation to all o f our senses simultaneously. 
Entities can  be  seen , heard, sm elled , felt, and tasted, 
sometimes all at once. And as w e engage with the objects in 
our environment w e ourselves contribute to the continuous 
fluxion in proprioceptive and visual feedback to our own 
sensory systems. How could a naive observer— a newborn, for 
instance—perceive anything but unrelated patterns of visual, 
acoustic, and tactile stimulation, in William James’s (1890) 
fam ous phrase a “bloom ing, buzzing confusion”? Modern 
thinkers proposed that perceivers must learn to interpret 
and integrate sensations before meaningful perception o f 
objects and events could happen for them. This so-called 
“constructionist” approach, which dominated the perception 
psychology o f the twentieth century, presupposed that the 
different forms of stimulation from the various senses must 
be integrated or organized in the brain and therefore posed a 
“binding problem” for perception— the thought (still exercising 
many) is that sensory stimulation has to be united by a separate 
mechanism that som ehow  achieves a meeting of differently 
coded  information from different channels on som e com m on 
ground.1 (Some of us knitters are familiar with another binding 
problem, this one in the kitchen; and often the solution to this 
one is just more eggs.)
It was not until J.J. Gibson pioneered what is now  referred 
to as the “ecological” view of perception that integrationist 
presuppositions vis-a-vis perceptual development were seriously 
questioned. Gibson held that different streams of information, 
as such, posed no special problem  for unitary perception 
because multiple processing o f input is a norm in cognition. 
In fact, the senses are highly interactive and cooperate in the 
detection of invariant aspects of stimulus arrays— so much so 
that w e should recognize only one “perceptual system.” What 
Gibson did was focus psychologists’ attention upon invariants 
in stimulus arrays. And he taught psychology that the first things 
of which an organism becom es perceptually aware and upon 
which anchored, may well not lie as content in any one sensory 
modality, but may instead lie in the higher-order invariants in the 
blooming and buzzing array. This is an Aristotelian idea.
Aristotle had postulated a “sensus communis”— an amodal 
or com m on  sense—which he thought was responsible for
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perceiving the qualities of things that were more general and 
not specific to single senses ( “com m on sensibles”). According 
to Aristotle, com m on sensibles included motion, rest, number, 
form, magnitude, and unity. This inventory has a strong 
resemblance to lists of the amodal by contemporary perceptual 
theorists following Gibson’s lead.2
The conceptual keys to unlocking how detection of such 
qualities is achieved are overlap and redundancy. As Aristotle 
observed long ago, amodal information is not specific to a 
particular sensory modality but is information com m on to 
several senses. Such things as temporal and spatial features of 
a scene are typically conveyed in multiple senses: the rhythm 
or rate of a ball bouncing or hands clapping are good examples. 
Rhythm in both cases can be picked up visually and acoustically. 
And when it is conveyed in overlapping media (as in these 
examples), the redundancy makes the temporal features highly 
salient. And so understanding the pickup of amodal information 
involves understanding the production of salience—a topic that 
is still in its infancy.
A vast body o f research conducted over the last twenty- 
five years of the twentieth century confirms that even young 
infants are adept perceivers o f amodal stimulation.3 Infants 
detect the temporal aspects of stimulation such as synchrony, 
rhythm, tempo, and prosody com m on to visual and acoustic 
information that proceeds from single events, as well as spatial 
collocation of objects and their sound sources, and changes in 
intensity across the senses. “These com petencies,” as Bahrick 
and Lickliter write, “provide the foundation for the perception 
of meaningful and relevant aspects of stimulation in social and 
nonsocial events....In our view, detection of amodal information 
in early development provides a radical and efficacious solution 
to the so-called ‘binding’ problem...The task of development 
becom es to differentiate increasingly more specific information 
from the global array through detecting invariant patterns of 
both multimodal and unimodal stimulation.”4
This is a lesson that philosophy has had a much harder 
time learning. And this is due entirely to the profound influence 
that British Empiricist dogm a has exercised  on m odern 
philosophical sensibilities— not com m on sense. This dogma 
goes against the grain of knitting. The British epistemological 
tradition, to Hume himself, consistently drew a categorical 
distinction between sensing/observing, on the one side, and 
judging, on the other. But com m on parlance does not draw 
any such firm line. So, for example, it is unremarkable to hear 
it said: “1 see that the glasses are missing from his face in the 
photo,” where of course the sense data do not go as far as the 
utterer says. Today’s empiricists draw the seductive conclusion 
that something— something much more in the way of judgment 
and much less present in the stimulus— has been superadded 
to sensation in between the time 1 look at the photo and the 
time 1 make the utterance. But this is deceptive. For not since 1 
was a neonate (and for that matter long before that still) has my 
experience been anything but a matter of “superadding” (if the 
name is apt, which it probably is not). 1 notice that 1 can make it 
through this doorway, he observes that they can make it up the 
mountain pass, 1 see that the picture on the wall needs adjusting. 
And all these things happen automatically, effortlessly. Better 
and better judgment is what normal human development—and 
knitting, too— is all about.
W hat transpires over the developm ental interval is 
expertise, as the organism acts upon its environment to bring 
about changes to it and, thereby, to its own organismic states. 
Feedback is the key. Now, expertise consists o f a series of 
(typically incremental) achievements that make the critical 
features o f my environment ever m ore prominent in my 
perception, so that they can effectively guide my behavior. As 1
grow up, it becom es more and more true that certain features of 
my environment have a more and more direct and regularized 
bearing on my behavior, as 1 learn to respond in more and 
more regularly effective ways. 1 becom e an increasingly more 
reliable channel through which certain environmental cues get 
transformed into certain human behaviors.
The phenom enon of expertise (sometimes referred to as 
“flow”) is interesting in its own right. In expert performance— of 
such things as, for example, walking, riding a bicycle, playing 
tennis, performing on a musical instrument, driving a car, skilled 
typing, and, of course, knitting— the body, rather than the mind, 
seems to be the locus of control over the behavior. J. Jastrow’s 
description (penned in 1906) of this phenom enon is still the 
most evocative: “At the outset each step of the performance is 
separately and distinctly the object of attention and effort; and 
as practice proceeds and expertness is gained...the separate 
portions thereof becom e fused into larger units, which in turn 
make a constantly diminishing demand upon consciousness.”5 
Expert perform ance is, as 1 have put it elsew here, the 
phenom enon of molarization of behavior. Expert performance 
com es in yards rather than in inches. Just as knitting com es in 
patches, rather than in stitches.
Equally, learning to see something as requiring handling a 
certain way— a loop on my needle, for example, as requiring 
knitting a particular way— is not only possible and desirable, 
but also even necessary. So let’s turn to my second thesis: it 
is possible to “observe” our reasons for doing something— for 
doing the right thing (for example, seeing what stitch or stretch 
of stitches should com e next), and that a learning process 
makes this possible (for example, seeing a twist of yarn as a 
stitch within a particular context is seeing a reason to knit it, 
and moreover to knit it in a particular way).
Three Cheers for Aristotle, Part 2: The Knitter Is Not 
a Lawgiver but a Lawreeeiver
Let’s take that point more slowly. 1 want to make a sweater—  
that sweater. 1 secure the pattern, and yarn, and accessories 
accordingly, adopting the pattern as (roughly) my plan o f 
action. My desire to make that sweater provides me reason to 
follow the pattern. But 1 also have reasons to depart from the 
pattern— to modify, improvise, or personalize it. 1 am skilled at 
such improvisation, and have been pleased with my results. 
And 1 also have reasons to do what 1 can to make my execution 
of the project as easy—and even as pleasurable— as possible. 
W ho doesn’t? So obviously 1 don’t undertake to follow a pattern 
too difficult for my skill level, though 1 might want to challenge 
myself a bit, to develop my knitting skills. My reasons vis-a- 
vis this sweater project are thus very complex. But they get 
som ehow  focused upon and em bodied by the pattern. The 
pattern summarizes what 1 need/intend to do, if somewhat 
imperfectly.
One view of the matter, centered upon Harvard, is the view 
that a norm— in my case, the knitting pattern— is rather like a 
law that 1 give to myself. But this view harmonizes ill with the 
experience of the knitter. Here’s why:
A norm is an itinerary—a kind of script of what 1 need to 
do. That 1 experience myself as needing or intending to perform 
it (however imperfectly) is what makes it a script, rather than 
a story or simply a pleasing pattern of marks or sounds. (The 
fact that 1 can inscribe, transcribe, or read my itinerary is a 
testament to my ability to use tools as aids to m em ory and 
cognition— to extend my functioning by adding to my repertoire 
elements of the world— as well as communicate and receive 
com m unications that facilitate my cognition.) A norm is 
something that is cognized as to b e  reproduced, in some fashion, 
by me, in my present circumstances.
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Similarly, when 1 am in the middle of making the sleeve o f 
the sweater, say, 1 view a particular loop upon my needles as 
needing knitting in a particular way, rather than another way, 
and rather than simply being ignored or dropped. A loop appears 
to inherit or acquire that quality of needing-to-be-knit-thus-and- 
so from the pattern. (And if I’m mistaken about a particular loop, 
my sweater will suffer for it. It will not be executed according 
to the pattern, or even according to a modified, improvised, or 
personalized vision o f that pattern.)
But how  do 1 manage to arrive at the place where such 
loops elicit from me the “they need knitting in a particular 
way rather than another” response? How do 1 learn to “see 
what needs to com e next” (to put the question Wittgenstein’s 
way)?
Perhaps 1 consult an inscription o f the chosen pattern. 
This is less than ideal. Remember, 1 have reasons to make 
execution o f my sweater as easy and as fun as possible, and 
unremitting consultations with inscriptions o f the pattern stand 
in the way of that. 1 need to implement the pattern in a more 
“direct” way—a way that bypasses the constant intrusion o f the 
pattern inscription in a micromanagerial way. 1 need to learn the 
pattern rather than follow  it in a tedious step-by-step way. Just 
as 1 learned to knit properly, rather than follow an exhaustive set 
o f step-by-step instructions for looping, hooking, and shaping 
yarn on fingers and needles. (Patterns that gave instructions in 
these terms would be unspeakably tiresome tomes rather than 
succinct single pages.)
So once more: How do 1 manage to arrive at the place 
where 1 simply and directly “see” such loops as-needing-knitting 
in a particular way rather than another? How do 1 learn to “see 
what needs to com e next”? Here is my answer: 1 manage to 
adopt (perhaps even create) concepts o f what I’m doing in 
small enough chunks that a brief inspection (after a period 
o f training) will allow me to apply the concepts to the loop. 
Acquiring the seeing-as skill is a conceptual achievement, in 
addition to all the other conceptual achievements 1 already (at 
my advanced age) have to my credit. Here is a somewhat more 
detailed account o f this matter.
Suppose the sweater pattern calls for fifty rows o f knitting 
a rather com plex lace stitch that repeat every six rows and 
over a stretch o f ten stitches: the same sort o f loops recur, 
but in different configurations over that stretch, but the whole 
configuration will repeat itself both vertically (every six rows) 
and horizontally (every ten stitches). There might be more than 
one way of breaking up the sixty-stitch configuration so as to 
“know where 1 am in it” at any given moment. 1 might decide 
to break it up for myself as follows: the first two rows do X, the 
second do Y, and the third do Z. While along the first two rows 
the first three stitches do A, the second do B, and the third do
C, with a “separating” stitch before repeating. Perhaps you will 
see the pattern slightly differently. No matter: your way might 
work better for you, given your training and other cognitive 
econom ies, while mine might work better for me. (Obviously, 
1 might well have no knowledge o f how you will see fit to do it, 
so as to compare. 1 simply devise a way for myself, and 1 might 
well miss a simpler way.)
Once I’ve grasped this way of “articulating” the pattern— 
and this way might well com e only once I’ve actually practiced 
the stitch for a while—1 will com e to “see” my position in the 
configuration whilst in the process o f knitting a loop, and 1 will 
“see” that loop as requiring knitting a particular way. It takes 
som e skill as well as som e practice—and som e confidence 
that the practice will take me where 1 want to go. Once I’ve 
achieved this, 1 can leave the pattern inscription behind, at least 
while 1 work the fifty rows. (The fifty-first row might require 
me to modify things, for example, so as to shape the armhole
and shoulder seams, and 1 will need to reconceptualize what 
1 am doing so as to work that span o f the pattern easily and 
enjoyably.)
Taking onboard the concepts X/Y/Z and A/B/C is a kind o f 
learning. The achievement o f these concepts is my way o f not 
having to consult the pattern inscription repeatedly, and in that 
way actually internalizing the norms it contains. When 1 achieve 
my network o f concepts, 1 becom e less dependent upon the 
pattern inscription, all the while in som e sense having formed 
a substitute for it internal to myself. This process, as I’m arguing 
in a larger project, is an achievement o f the cognitive learning 
strategy—which happens to be a dual-process strategy— that 
evolution has endow ed many organisms and not just humans. 
And it’s special to practical skills, with observation being one 
o f them.
Now, how  does this kind of learning differ from the (more 
theoretical) variety that 1 enjoy when 1 find things out about, 
say, the civil war or Peano’s axioms or the laws governing the 
trajectories o f projectiles or the natural history of amphibians? 
Or the language we speak and the various cultures we navigate? 
This is a fundamental philosophical question. And my point 
has been that practical learning is very distinctive, and that 
learning norms falls into the category o f practical learning. 
Learning a norm involves acclimating oneself to and thereby 
internalizing norms that are initially external to oneself, just as 1 
acclimatize myself to an unfamiliar knitting pattern. And unless 
1 can expose my cognitive machinery to the norm as an Other 
(as it were, outside o f myself), 1 cannot begin to internalize 
it— 1 cannot begin to learn it. This is a very important feature 
about learning.
But if this is the case, then it is not at all clear that any sense 
can be made o f the idea that norm-learning is appropriately 
characterized as “giving a law to oneself.” It is much more like 
receiving a law than like giving one. But 1 will leave the details 
o f this argument for another occasion.
Finally, if learning to “see-as” in knitting is in any way 
characteristic of developing a range o f skills and learning one’s 
way around norms more generally, then it is clear why at least 
som e norms em body or are constituted by judgments: at least 
these norms can be articulated in conceptual terms. Following 
them is, at least in part, a conceptual achievement.
And so it turns out that at least som e learning involves 
the acquisition o f concepts, just as som e seeing involves the 
acquisition o f concepts. And therefore it is clear that seeing and 
believing are not the mutually exclusive categories supposed 
by modern empiricism.
Putting it down
Like God, the knitter knows the time to stop. It coincides with 
bedtime.
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